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Walter Benjamin’s Zur Kritik der Gewalt (‘On the Critique of 
Violence’):  reception, relevance, and a mis-diagnosis?* 
by Valerie Whittington
Abstract
Walter Benjamin’s early essay Zur Kritik der Gewalt [Zur Kritik] first 
published in 1921 is a notoriously difficult text, but its relevance to 
contemporary politics makes it a text to which theorists repeatedly 
return.  This reading takes issue with those critics, notably Axel 
Honneth, who see Benjamin’s project in Zur Kritik as fatally, 
dangerously flawed. It is suggested here that Benjamin’s text, despite 
the difficulties, still posits the possibility of a ‘lookout point’ - not 
prescriptive per se but in keeping with his abiding interest in literature, 
metaphorical and exegetical.  There is no ground on which to stand 
that does not in effect constitute the lookout point of the place and 
times of the lookout, but this reading suggests that the Benjaminian 
lookout point is the lookout which is never fixed because it is not 
‘looking out’ on but towards others, and is not merely addressing and 
prescribing, but talking with itself and others.  That Benjamin embraces 
religious language to effect this move, perhaps suggesting, a lookout 
in judgment from a fixed point, from some ‘higher’ (transcendental) 
ground, certainly might be troubling for some, but it will be suggested 
these anxieties are misplaced.
In 2018, while the UK and USA condemned illegal killing by chemical weapons in the Syrian 
conflict they sanctioned a response through conventional ones (Graham et al., 2018). When 
the UK was condemning the alleged attempted murder by poison of one of its citizen by the 
agents of Russia (Barry and Pérez-Peña, 2018), inside Yarl’s Wood immigration detention 
and removal centre, detainees, without any legal limit upon their detention were embarked 
upon hunger strikes (DV - detained voices, 2018) (Hacker, 2018) (Bulman, 2018). Hunger 
strike - that form of strike Benjamin did not consider in his essay, is a self-directed violent 
alternative to other-directed violent acts of resistance by those in State detention. Those for 
whom the right to labour for a wage is itself denied and so who cannot withhold it, threaten 
instead, self-violence and their potential ‘martyrdom’ through death by hunger strike: 
replacing the withdrawal of their labour with the withdrawal of their circumscribed ‘mere 
life’ from the State. In the economy of violence, past and present, the exchange of threats, 
peremptory extra-judicial and judicial execution and considered self-directed and other-
directed harm, does Benjamin’s text offer anything beyond the critical purchase already 
achieved by previous critics? Benjamin’s presentation of the Biblical commandment ‘Thou 
shalt not kill’ challenges the reader to ask the worth of a commandment, any commandment, 
in the era of modernity when the pursuit of an agreed ‘lookout point’ for morally ballasted 
political legitimacy seems not only improbable but also inadvisable.  The aim of this essay 
is to suggest that there is a reading of Benjamin’s text that is neither aggressively religious 
(normative, prescriptive) nor aggressively atheistic (and pragmatic) and that suggests a 
way out of the potential theoretical impasse that results from either stance. 
* The author would like to thank the SSPT reviewers of this article for their responses. 
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While the main theorist addressed is Axel Honneth (Honneth, 2009), Zur Kritik has received 
close attention from numerous critics including, Georgio Agamben ([1970], 2009), Judith 
Butler (2006), Jacques Derrida (1990), Marc de Wilde (2011), Jürgen Habermas (1979), Ari 
Hirvonen (2012/2013), Eric Jacobson (2003), Tracy McNulty, (2007) Darrow Schecter (2010) 
and Richard Wolin (1994). There is not space in this essay to address the individual positions 
of each of these critics, for anyone familiar with their comments on Benjamin’s essay it will 
be clear where the present piece agrees and takes issue with these respective authors. 
Reception 
In his chapter on Walter Benjamin’s Zur Kritik  in The Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of 
Critical Theory, (2009) Axel Honneth offers both an insightful analysis and a flawed criticism 
of Benjamin’s text and in the essay that follows his reading is cast as the ‘misdiagnosis’ of 
the title here. In his Chapter titled ‘Saving the Sacred with a Philosophy of History: On 
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”’ Honneth recognises that Benjamin’s text is one of ‘vexing 
subtlety’ (2009: 88). He identifies the circuitous methodology Benjamin adopts to reach 
his goal, initially cited only fleetingly at the start – the problematic of the ‘philosophico-
historical’. Under the guise of an exploration of the instantiation of violence under the Law, 
and the way in which ‘lawful’ violence obscures its genesis in the founding violence and 
maintenance of the State, Benjamin sets out a ‘religio-philosophical’ text.  In Benjamin’s 
view the founding violence of the State is the echo of the violence of mythical Gods in 
the lives of mankind and in the subsequent monotheistic religious settlement. As Honneth 
notes, Benjamin was writing in 1919, under the influence of having recently read Bloch’s 
Spirit of Utopia (Bloch, [1918], 2000), in communication and conversation with Gershom 
Scholem, and after documented influences such as his readings of works by George Sorel, 
Charles Péguy and Erich Unger, which according to Honneth strengthened in Benjamin an 
already nascent anti-utilitarianism, identified in his ‘Program of the Coming Philosophy’ 
(Benjamin, [1917], 1996). Although each distinct, Honneth recognises these writers as ‘united 
by their tendency to hold the concept of the political as far as possible from the pursuit 
of interests so as to equip it with the potential to radically disclose new intellectual and 
moral orders’ (2009: 91). According to Honneth, this would have attracted Benjamin and 
encouraged the development of his thought along the lines it takes in Zur Kritik. Honneth 
observes: ‘It is hard to imagine that Benjamin did not perceive such a political concept of 
the extraquotidian as a chance to explore the field of the political, as well as the model of 
religious intrinsicness’ (2009: 92). Benjamin’s reading material at that time, his observation 
of the failed revolution of 1918, the rising question of Palestine, and his experience of the 
‘pauperizing’ effect of capitalism, led him Honneth believes to a conviction that ‘breaking 
out of the apparently pathological contemporary society was only possible by concentrating 
on a radical redefinition of political action’ (2009: 92). 
 Honneth claims Benjamin was inspired by the sacralisation of the notion of proletarian 
revolution poetically suggested in Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia. Benjamin effects a reversal of the 
view that:- 
any rational politics finds its limits in “violence”, while in “law” 
it finds its legitimate starting point […][Benjamin] revers[es] the 
polarity of these two concepts, so that violence appears as the course 
and fundament of politics and law, to the contrary, as its endpoint. 
The function of this proposed reinterpretation is to be able to interpret 
politics as an event that is in itself free of ends, detached from all 
human purposes, and to that extent is “religious”.(Honneth, 2009: 94) 
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The placing of the word religious in inverted commas, indicates correctly the problematic 
identification between Benjamin’s critical trajectory and the mapping of it upon schemas 
of what counts as religious in any effective or precise fashion.  It is claimed here that in 
identifying Benjamin as engaged in a search to re-insert God and the ‘non-instrumentality’ 
of God into social reality, Honneth fails to get to grips with Benjamin’s use of religious 
tropes. Merely to ‘flag’ the problems inherent by the placing of the term inside commas 
does nothing to address that difficulty in Benjamin’s text, or in his more general use of 
religious discourse in his critical theory. 
 Judith Butler (2006) recognised that Benjamin applies to the commandment ‘Thou 
shalt not kill’ an exceptional exegesis and the present reading agrees with her view of 
the centrality of this move by Benjamin. She speaks of the perlocutionary; in this essay 
Benjamin’s approach is taken as effectively treating the commandment as an interrogatory. 
It is argued here that Benjamin uses his example of the commandment to leverage history 
from under its metaphysical and theological wreckage to bring the ethical again into relation 
with context, time and in his own words towards a ‘decisive approach to its temporal data’ 
(Benjamin, 1978/2007: 300). This cannot be understood, without some observations on 
Benjamin’s view of History as a theoretical praxis and his use of religious language in that 
context. There is a connection here with the later ‘Über den Begriff der Geschichte’ (‘On the 
Concept of History’) (Benjamin, [1940] 2014) which offers the image of an illusory linear 
history unfolding before the Angel of history’s backward-looking face. Illusory because 
for Benjamin – History must be construed as a constellation in which the ‘Jetztzeit’ of the 
present is ‘shot through with chips of Messianic time’ (Benjamin, 1978/2007: 255). While the 
Angel is powerless to stop the carnage to assert its own ‘totalising’ repair job, the historian, 
in Benjamin’s view has a better chance of success. While history may appear a fast and 
furious chain reaction irreducible to stillness, Benjamin insists, it is in the stillness of the 
critic, and the Stillstand of critical thinking, that the endeavour of understanding (and 
revolution) becomes possible. In the face of rapid and continuing change and manifest and 
intended violence both personal and political, despite the weight of linear cause-obsessed 
historiography, in this moment the historian can find a ‘lookout point’ from the position of 
Stillstand and ‘blast open the continuum of history’ (Benjamin, 1978/2007: 254). The ‘religious’ 
language here is highly significant and is highlighted by Arendt in a footnote to Benjamin’s 
text. The word Jetztzeit, she notes, has been chosen by Benjamin in preference to Gegenwart in 
order to suggest a different kind of ‘present’ – the mystical nunc stans (Benjamin, 1978/2007: 
253).The Jetztzeit and Stillstand are metaphorical and Messianic because Benjamin has 
found in religious language the means towards a revised historiography. For Schecter the 
interrelation of ‘historical process’, ‘the recurrent catastrophe of war and exploitation, into 
redemptive revolution’ is in Benjamin’s constellation of concepts both ‘non-deterministic 
and non-accidental’. (2010: 57,63) Schecter’s focus is upon the crisis for ‘knowledge’ that 
is at stake in this recognitive redemption which appears as an impossible epiphany from 
the past - prefigured before it is known.  In this piece, it is cited to support the view that 
Benjamin’s use of religious tropes is not merely reducible to the re-insertion of ‘God’ in 
history, law or politics, but to suggest that it is a recuperation of exegetical tools abandoned 
with the ‘death of God’ in modernity. Benjamin is not concerned with the recuperation of 
a transcendent power, but with the intuited revolutionary potential of a transcendental 
philosophy in the service of the profane world as that is lived and experienced, and not as 
its master.  
 This account considers two moments in Benjamin’s piece that have caused particular 
difficulty for critics including Honneth and which are addressed in turn: 
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i.	 Benjamin’s	identification	of	the	weakness	of	Parliaments
ii.	 The	nature	of	Divine	violence,	its	sovereignty	and	its	relation	to	the	commandment	
‘Thou	shalt	not	kill’	
i.	 Benjamin’s	identification	of	the	weakness	of	Parliaments
In	 our	 time	 parliaments	 […]	 offer	 the	 familiar,	 woeful	 spectacle	
because	 they	 have	 not	 remained	 conscious	 of	 the	 revolutionary	
forces	to	which	they	owe	their	existence	[…]	They	lack	the	sense	that	
a	lawmaking	violence	is	represented	by	themselves;	no	wonder	that	
they	 cannot	 achieve	 decrees	 worthy	 of	 this	 violence,	 but	 cultivate	
in	 compromise	 a	 supposedly	 nonviolent	 manner	 of	 dealing	 with	
political	 affairs.	 This	 remains	 however,	 a	 “product	 situated	within	
the	 mentality	 of	 violence,	 because	 the	 effort	 toward	 compromise	
is	 motivated	 not	 internally	 but	 from	 outside,	 by	 opposing	 effort,	
because	 no	 compromise,	 however	 freely	 accepted,	 is	 conceivable	
without	a	compulsive	character.	‘It	would	be	better	otherwise’	is	the	
underlying	feeling	in	every	compromise.”1		Significantly,	the	decay	of	
parliaments	has	perhaps	alienated	as	many	minds	from	the	ideal	of	
a	nonviolent	resolution	of	political	conflicts	as	were	attracted	to	it	by	
the	war.	(1978/2007:	288)
Benjamin	explores	through	his	examples	(conscription,	the	death	penalty,	and	the	actions	of	
the	police)	the	potentially	lethal	violence	at	the	disposal	of	the	liberal	democratic	State.	To	
evaluate	the	above	statement,	which	on	the	surface	appears	to	call	for	lawmaking	violence	
from	Parliaments,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	Benjamin’s	consideration	of	the	ways	in	which	
violence	works	within	the	contemporary	State	he	knew	and	experienced,	in	both	its	 law	
preserving	 and	 law-making	 forms.	 His	 opening	 sentence	 is	 explicit.	 His	 observations	
address	parliaments	in	his	own	time.	
	 All	violence	is	problematic	because	of	the	difficulty	of	establishing	why	any	violence	
at	all	can	be	regarded	as	‘legitimate’.	To	explore	this	thought	Benjamin	begins	his	analysis	
in Zur Kritik	with	a	comparison	of	 the	respective	positions	on	 ‘means	and	ends’	 that	he	
claims	reflect	natural	and	positive	law.	As	being	concerned	with	‘ends’	natural	law	in	his	
view	must	be	unconcerned	with	‘means’,	and	in	being	indifferent	to	the	substantive	content	
of	 law,	 positive	 law	must	 be	 unconcerned	with	 ends:	 positive	 law	 can	 only	 be	 used	 to	
judge	means	and	natural	law	to	judge	ends.	His	opening	paragraphs	note	that	traditionally	
violence	is	considered	only	as	a	means,	however	neither	positive	nor	natural	law	are	able	
to	help	the	critic	to	decide	whether	violence	can	ever	be	moral	or	just	so	as	to	be	considered	
a	worthy	end	in	itself.	The	solution	to	the	antinomy	he	states	would	only	be	found	in	the	
discovery	of	some	 ‘independent	criteria	both	of	 just	ends	and	of	 just	means’	 (1978/2007:	
278)	and	this	appears	to	be	the	direction	of	his	 thought.	He	claims	that	when	the	use	of	
violence	is	considered	as	means,	there	are	sanctioned	and	unsanctioned	uses	of	it	and	when	
the	criteria	of	judging	are	considered,	this	points	to	a	standpoint	beyond	the	terms	of	either	
positive	or	natural	law:	‘a	historico-philosophical	view’	(1978/2007:	279).	
	 There	can	be	no	clear	determination	in	natural	law	because	the	distinction	drawn	
merely	 between	 whether	 violence	 is	 used	 for	 legitimate	 or	 illegitimate	 ends	 has	 to	 be	
rejected.	 In	 positive	 law	 only	 the	 historical	 conditions	 of	 the	 production	 of	 a	 law	 that	
endorses	violence	can	authorise	(i.e.	give	authority	to)	its	use.	In	this	sense,	positive	law	is	
closer	to	being	able	to	identify	the	historically	endorsed	‘ends’	of	positive	law	by	allowing	
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examination of the ‘specific legal conditions’ of its production (Benjamin, 1978/2007: 280). 
Benjamin suggests there is a residue of ‘natural’ ends that accord the use of violence a 
different function to that proposed by positive law. This arena of natural law outside 
positive law is the ‘natural law’ that permits individuals to pursue their own ends, yet it is 
proscribed by positive law in as many areas as possible: ‘it follows that law sees violence in 
the hands of individuals as a danger undermining the legal system’ (1978/2007: 280). This 
violence outside of law is a threat to law not just for the ends it may be used for, but in itself: 
nowhere is this more evident to Benjamin than in the power of organized labour to strike. 
Benjamin acknowledges there is no apparent violence in the withdrawal of labour, but 
there is violence in the ‘extortion’ that is perpetrated by the strikers ‘to use force in attaining 
certain ends’ (1978/2007, p.282). Although, the hunger strike is not considered directly by 
Benjamin, at the time Benjamin was writing, a general strike also induced hunger among 
those who sacrificed their pay and livelihoods in a strike, a point he does not explore in 
his depiction of the violence and ‘threat’ inherent in workers’ strikes – the suffering the 
strikers themselves endure and the courage required to make that sacrifice. While the State 
might admit the right to strike in individual industries and in specified circumstances, the 
state acts to prevent a general strike. There is a clear inconsistency in the State’s position 
towards the use of violence, but it is explicable because in Benjamin’s words a general strike 
is of a different order to a simple industrial dispute because in a general strike it has the 
potential power ‘to found and modify legal conditions’ (1978/2007: 283). Exactly the hope 
of the revolutionary syndicalist Georges Sorel: ‘The idea of the general strike, engendered 
by the practice of violent strikes, entails the conception of an irrevocable overthrow’: Sorel, 
Reflection on Violence – Appendix I, ‘Apology for Violence’ [1908] (1999:281). Kant noted the 
need for States to ‘found’ new legal orders with ceremonies that marked such a change. 
Whether undertaken by the ‘great criminal’ or by the ‘military’ – ‘there is in all such violence 
a lawmaking character’ (Benjamin, 1978/2007: 283). 
 Militarism too reveals a dual character in violence, again ‘law preserving’ and 
Benjamin uses the example of the violence of general conscription as the most blatant 
example of this where the citizens of a state are mobilised to defend it (1978/2007: 284). 
According to Benjamin, this law-preserving violence is harder to criticise without a broad 
critique of all legal violence or ‘legal and executive force’ (1978/2007: 284). Only the 
categorical imperative of Kant stands against it and even here Benjamin doubts the strength 
of this which stated one must ‘act in such a way that at all times you use humanity both 
in your person and in the person of all others as an end, and never merely as a means’ - 
leaving open the possibility that provided one is simultaneously treating oneself or another 
as an end, that it would be acceptable to also use oneself or another as a means. In a footnote 
Benjamin wonders ‘whether it is permissible to use, or allow to be used, oneself or another 
in any respect as a means’ (1978/2007: 285). Benjamin prefers what he describes as ‘pure 
means’ to effect change. This requires greater coverage than is here available but some 
description is necessary.  These pure and direct nonviolent means of resolving conflict begin 
with ‘subjective preconditions’ (1978/2007: 289). They are a feature that Benjamin describes 
as having ‘enormous scope’ in determining law (2014, loc.33619-33632). ‘Pure’ means 
[eine Politik der Reinen Mittel] govern ‘peaceful intercourse between private individuals’ 
(1978/2007: 290-291). They focus upon the ‘culture of the heart’ (Jacobson, 2003, Ch.6 ) and 
give rise to interpersonal nonviolent conflict resolution at the level of individuals and also 
in the realm of diplomacy. 
 When it comes to ‘law preserving’ violence, Benjamin believes a critique is much 
harder to produce than it seems. It requires ‘Reason’ to take a resolute approach. The use 
of the death penalty appears, its highest and most extreme form, the very extremity of 
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which suggests its dis-proportionality. It induces a sense of rotteness because (and this is 
a very peculiar expression) ‘a finer sensibility…knows itself to be infinitely remote from 
conditions in which fate might have imperiously shown itself in such a sentence’ (1978/2007, 
p. 286). [ Eben in ihr aber kündigt zugleich irgend etwas Morsches im Recht am vernehmlichsten 
dem feineren Gefühl sich an, weil dieses sich von Verhältnissen, in welchen das Schicksal in eigner 
Majestät in einem solchen Vollzug sich gezeigt hätte, unendlich fern weiß. (Benjamin, 2014, e-book 
Loc. 33577-33579)]. It is difficult to determine what Benjamin means by this, unless it is a 
personification of the reaction of the pure ‘end-in-itself-ness’ of the individual. The ‘finer 
sensibility’ is one who senses intuitively that they should never be treated merely as a 
means, and so recognises injustice in the sentence imposed, the ‘weakness’ of the law, and 
its ‘unsound’ nature in bolstering its own power as opposed to bolstering the ends of Justice. 
In his consideration of Benjamin’s discussion of the death penalty, Honneth remarks that 
‘the real function of carrying out the death penalty turns out to be the reassertion of the law, 
that is, we cannot speak of a displacement of means and ends but only of a concealment of 
the real end’ (Honneth, 2009: 113). Honneth suggests that for Benjamin, the discussion of 
the death penalty simply acts as a bridge to the theme of law preserving violence without 
considering the relevance of Benjamin’s extraordinary comment on the uncanny sensation 
of ‘rottenness’ elicited by the penalty. 
 Benjamin’s claim goes much further, to the observation that all legal agreements 
contain sanctions of one form or another in which there is ‘latent’ violence (1978/2007: 288). 
The situation where the ubiquitous presence of violence ‘disappears’ from consciousness can 
only ultimately end in the decay of the institution of law, and by extension the weakening 
of Parliaments. Honneth’s reading of Benjamin on this point is strongly antipathetic and 
demands consideration for the expression of a fear also echoed by others that Benjamin is 
giving way here to a form of atavistic antidemocratic thought. 
 Butler’s article more than any other cited here locates Benjamin’s essay historically 
and questions why it has been so variously and problematically received. Perhaps seen by 
some as inadequate to meet even at the theoretical level the challenge and fact of emergent 
Nazism in Germany, subjected by Derrida, among others, to criticism on the basis of a failure 
to appreciate parliamentarianism. According to Butler, Hannah Arendt also expressed 
the view that Benjamin failed to appreciate the importance of law for community and the 
exercise of ‘collective freedom’ (Butler, 2006: 206-7), nevertheless Arendt, echoed Benjamin 
when she also expressed the view that law is based on violence. In ‘Introduction to politics’ 
Arendt wrote: ‘law . . . has something violent about it in terms of both its origins and its 
nature’  (Jurkevics, 2017: 359). 
 What troubles some critics is that it is clear that Carl Schmitt’s critique of 
Parliamentarianism is significant for Benjamin although the two men see in Parliamentary 
structures very different evils at play.²  For Schmitt, the lack of strong executive power to act 
‘exceptionally’ reveals a weakness, which itself reveals the presumption in Schmitt, of the 
necessity and centrality of the State – or at least of the exercise of Sovereign power. Schmitt 
uncovers the illegitimacy of otherwise legal Parliamentary ‘power’ – but with a view that 
finally rejects legality in favour of a Sovereign legitimacy based upon charismatic force and 
acclamation.³  Benjamin also sees in the Parliamentary form weakness and illegitimacy. 
Benjamin, sees the contradictions of a State where enforced (violent) conscription plays a 
part in its preservation, but rather than seeking to reassert the necessity of centralised State 
power by some other legitimising strategy, he explores instead a legitimising path between 
anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism and liberalism, towards a reformed ‘other’ State which can 
be imagined peace-able i.e. brought into existence through peaceful means, self-sustaining 
by peaceful means towards peaceful ends - as might be imagined between persons in private 
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life. If this were instituted, then Benjamin suggests a ‘happy’ and thus profane ‘other’ 
state might exist. This State would be neither u-topic nor theocratic and would be both 
dependent on (and co-dependent with) the Messianic (Divine) State coming into existence 
and discovering, by a critical approach to the past, the seeds of its ‘redemption’. 
	 Honneth	for	understandable	reasons	disapproves	the	connection	with	Schmitt	but	
also more generally takes issue with Benjamin’s lack of use of authorities on natural and 
positive law (Honneth, 2009: 106 – ‘not a single author is mentioned by name’). He also 
dislikes	Benjamin’s	 too	 ready	 theoretical	generalisation	 from	specific	examples	of	police	
extra-legal	violent	behaviour.	His	criticism	is	a	little	too	broad	given	the	limited	scope	of	
Benjamin’s interest in reproducing the natural/positivist positions within jurisprudence in 
his	essay.	Benjamin’s	admittedly	broad	stroke	approach	to	the	position	of	means	and	ends	
in natural and positive law is broadly speaking, fair comment. While Honneth castigates 
Benjamin for this he points to the historical situatedness of Benjamin’s analysis with the 
observation that Benjamin limits the scope of his analysis to the European context because: 
‘the real reason for the restriction can probably be regarded as the historical circumstance 
that precisely in Europe at the time, there was scarcely another more politically explosive 
question than that of the legal legitimacy of non-state, revolutionary violence’ (2009: 8). 
This is only half the story and from Benjamin’s perspective the lesser half, because in 
Benjamin’s	text	it	is	clear	that	the	‘villain’	of	his	piece,	the	dark	figure	of	the	shadows	is	not	
revolutionary violence – but state sanctioned police violence which in reading it as it were 
‘crosswise’ Honneth disregards. 
 In criticising Benjamin’s turn to a consideration of police violence Honneth is almost 
perversely dismissive:
This line of thought obviously owes itself to vivid impressions of police 
abuses of power at the time. The excited tone, the choice of adjectives, 
the open antipathy—all reveal that Benjamin must have been very 
precisely informed about concrete cases of such transgressions from 
contemporary sources. The empirical bases of the argument provoke 
the question, however, of whether the surely innumerable examples 
can be generalized into a principled thesis about the removal of 
constraints on police violence in the constitutional state. Benjamin 
does not seem to have more in hand than the dubious observation 
that democratic regimes lack the exemplary authority to bind their 
personnel. (Honneth, 2009 p.114) 
Honneth’s use of the word ‘transgressions’ make the incidents he suggests Benjamin was 
aware of, seem as though they are exceptions that stand out from a norm of otherwise 
lawful exercise of power. Yet clearly the political crises confronting Europe and Germany in 
particular were increasingly leading to a political norm in which the violent and arbitrary 
exception appeared to be becoming established as the norm. It has been suggested that 
this slide towards violence both inside and outside the State, for example in the uprisings 
in	Upper	Silesia	in	1919-1921,	was	in	effect	lionised	and	in	some	senses	normalised	by	the	
victorious	Nazis	in	the	German	Nazified	State	a	decade	later.	
…"political" acts such as the August 1932 murder in the Upper 
Silesian village Potempa - the brutal murder of a Polish Communist 
sympathizer	by	drunken	SA-men	 	 -	 seemed	 to	fit	 coherently	 into	a	
mythological	Nazi	past	of	"old	fighters,"	raging	battles	against	leftists,	
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betrayal by the republic, and the like (Hunt Tooley, 1988).
The Potempa murderers were initially found guilty of murder and sentenced to death, 
but with political pressure from the right their death sentences were commuted to life 
imprisonment, and after the coming to power of the Nazis they were released. The men 
spent only seven months in prison before their release on March 18th 1933, described by 
von Papen as ‘the innocent sentenced victims of Potempa’ (Bessel, 1977: 252).
 Honneth appears to criticise Benjamin for being unable to transcend the limitations 
of his historical situatedness and to discredit him for lack of imagination and yet of all 
the truisms of Benjamin’s time it is undoubtedly a fact of history that this police and State 
sanctioned violence was to become evident and blatant in Benjamin’s lifetime and in the 
years immediately following his death.
 Honneth’s assertion of the capacity of binding state authority is less than reassuring 
and Benjamin’s observations are not at all dubious when in the violent wake of 9/11, 
governments of the UK and USA, both western constitutional ‘liberal’ democracies, 
endorsed ‘legal’ excuses for ‘extraordinary rendition’ and ‘off-site’ prisons where human 
rights and international conventions were (if not ultimately, then for a very long time) 
without legal purchase: a dismal reality paraded regularly with the sight of shackled men in 
bright orange suits seen at Guantanamo (Sands, 2005).  There is no comfort in the idea that 
‘law’ prevented these abuses taking place on ‘national soil’ and not much in the fact that 
eventually internationally agreed standards were finally reasserted. It does not take account 
of the long-standing nature of struggles against this tendency within the borders of modern 
democracies, of states such as the United Kingdom where ‘shoot to kill’ policies were still in 
operation in the late twentieth century⁴; the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, (PACE) 
the codes of which protect suspects against police abuse of power followed riots in London 
and other cities in 1981, and where only multiple claims of wrongful convictions (such as 
those of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Maguires)  produced pressure for the 
creation of a commission to review potential miscarriages of Justice.⁵   In these circumstances 
it is a little unfair to castigate Benjamin writing in Germany in 1919, for the possibility for 
democratic control lying ‘outside his imaginative horizon’ (Honneth, 2009: 114).
 With regard to Honneth’s criticism of the ‘untested’ nature of Benjamin’s 
generalizations upon the police – it is difficult to avoid concluding that the criticism is 
in itself weak as examples are there for the finding were Honneth willing to consider the 
claim more generously and with a longer view of its history in the democratic liberal 
state. Having dismissed Benjamin’s examples, Benjamin’s criticism of the weakness of 
Parliamentarianism warrants very little attention from Honneth: ‘Even if this critique of 
parliamentarism must appear somewhat questionable today, since it reveals an astonishing 
proximity to the antidemocratic thinking of Carl Schmitt,⁶  in the text it is thrown in as hardly 
more than an aside’ (Honneth, 2009: 115). This reading effectively dismisses the criticism of 
Parliamentarianism in its historical context – which again for Benjamin is absolutely key – 
to simply tar it with the brush of Schmittian anti-democratic thinking is to completely fail 
to appreciate the historical situation when Benjamin was writing. After all the murders of 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht took place at the beginning of 1919.  For an appraisal 
of violence in politics of the time and in particular during the Polish uprising of 1920 in 
Silesia, see Hunt Tooley (1988: 85-87). The fact that the social democrat Ebert was prepared 
to tolerate the Freikorps showed the lengths to which parliamentarians would go to ‘hold 
the line’ of the State in place. The danger of Honneth’s restatement of the excessive ‘fear’ of 
revolutionary violence of the time is that this also is in danger of restating an equally ‘vivid’ 
false impression of the time - the great danger of revolutionary violence - which was itself 
Whittington, Walter Benjamin’s Zur Kritik der Gewalt
52
close to an ‘overstatement’. In his 2016 book on political violence in Germany in 1918-1919 
Mark Jones concludes: 
For all of its achievements, however, Weimar was also founded on 
excessive violence, including an execution order that permitted 
soldiers to kill civilians at their own will. It was not simply a case of 
using violence to defeat an insurrectionary enemy. Once the Social 
Democratic leadership finally crossed the Rubicon in late December 
1918, with significant levels of popular support, the founders of 
the first truly democratic German state used violence as a means of 
communication: state-sponsored violence delivered the message that 
Germany would not join the ‘shatterzones’. [ … ] The government’s use 
of military force as a communicative tool explains why state-sponsored 
violence resulted in proportionally far more deaths than the violence 
of the state’s opponents on the extreme left. Its charismatic appeal also 
explains why political groups who had opposed far less dangerous 
acts of state violence before 1914, nevertheless supported military 
assaults during the first half of 1919. The scale of military operations 
might not have been necessary to defeat poorly armed and poorly 
led insurgents, but they offered an uncompromising message about 
the new government’s willingness to destroy its opponents, real and 
imagined. Under these circumstances, ideas about legal rights fell into 
line behind the needs of the state to demonstrate its uncompromising 
power. Small wonder that Max Weber publicly defined the state as 
the sole holder of the monopoly of force in a lecture to students in 
Munich in the second half of January 1919. (Jones, 2016, p. 326) 
The Max Weber lecture to which Jones alludes is ‘Politik als Beruf’. In conclusion, an 
appreciation of Benjamin’s insights cannot be fully informed without a degree of agreement 
with his criticism of the weakness of parliaments to limit and control both legal and extra-
legal political and police violence. Honneth is right that Benjamin’s examples do not always 
serve him well as supports for his argument. Honneth concludes that: 
The thoughts on the death penalty do not really thematize an 
indeterminacy of legal means, only a concealment of de facto ends. 
The reflections on the police owe themselves to a generalization 
of historical experiences whose systematic significance remains 
untested. To this extent, only the section on lawmaking violence serves 
to justify the thesis Benjamin pursues with his “immanent” critique 
of the legal system. There it could be shown that the constitutional 
state on the European model is not in a position to unambiguously 
determine legitimate forms of violence, since from the perspective of 
de facto validity, new, system-bursting sources of violent lawmaking 
always have to be recognized. The section that then deals with law-
preserving violence, in contrast, contributes very little to the thesis 
on the indeterminacy of constitutional norms, for beyond the two 
dubious examples, no considerations on the generalizability of their 
content are developed (Honneth, 2009, p.114).
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The problem with this conclusion is that it is based upon only a half reading of the 
examples Benjamin gives. Honneth presents the death penalty as merely an exemplar of 
law-preserving instrumentality. Honneth’s antipathy to Benjamin’s religiously inflected 
rejection of the Kantian subject may have obscured his view of the ‘injustice’ Benjamin 
suggests is intuitively recognised by the ‘rotteness’ of the penalty and its negation of the 
human-being-as-an-end-in-herself.  For a better elucidation of this Benjamin might also 
have asked to advocate the point on his behalf, the condemned murderer played by Peter 
Lorre in Fritz lang’s ‘M’ – although he would have had to wait another 11 years for the film to 
appear to do so.  The plea of the man who cannot help but do the evil he does, might as well 
stand, however grotesquely, for the man or woman who cannot help but be human: one of 
those whose violence is ‘manifest’ not calculated. Lorre’s character is precisely Benjamin’s 
manifestly violent man ‘in-himself’ and stands as a troubling block and a challenge for all 
those who seek legitimacy and violence in some form to be co-extensive. 
 The reduction of violence to its ‘manifest’ state collapses the subject-object relation 
of law and violence and in the personal reveals that ‘moral’ (either lawful or unlawful) 
violence is always done between persons – personhood itself being both the subject and 
object of human on human violence. A fact difficult to perceive in the era of the ‘impersonal’ 
drone strike. Darrow Schecter directly makes the link between the political and Benjamin’s 
subject-object relation at the level of the State and points to the analogous relations between 
legality/legitimacy and the ‘catastrophic “blind spot” that sanctions violence in the name of 
either just ends or just means’. The democratic liberal State uses coercive measures but why 
must the ‘free’ people of the State need to be protected by violent means from ‘unfree’ – 
‘enemies within’? (Schecter, 2010: 61-62) This is effectively because political legal positivism 
and exceptionalism are woven side by side into the liberal State in which ‘rational means 
(constantly neutral procedure corresponds to free elections and freedom of press and 
assembly) are really also a rational end’ (Schecter, 2010: 62). Reformism as a political strategy 
has no purchase and only overthrow is worth pursuing. A reading likely only to confirm 
the fears of those who see Benjamin as a dangerous anti-parliamentarian, but as will be 
shown below, this does not entail that he endorses the kind of anomic violence feared by 
some critics.   
ii. a utopian reality⁷ : The nature of Divine violence, its sovereignty and its relation to the 
commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ 
Honneth opens his analysis by saying at the outset that Benjamin concludes that only ‘God’ 
can be the basis and origin of transforming violence. Certainly, the category of the ‘Divine’ 
can take this referrant, and certainly Benjamin’s references to Biblical text is to the Judeo 
monotheistic God, but to suggest so seamlessly that ‘God’ is Benjamin’s answer, is reductive. 
Honneth makes the charge that Benjamin, following a pattern set in his intellectual youth 
‘continued to believe that the collapse of the present into mere means-ends thinking could 
only be opposed if the inner-worldly presence of a noninstrumental, divine being could 
be credibly demonstrated’ (Honneth, 2009: 90). Honneth sees  Benjamin as profoundly 
influenced by Bloch, Péguy, Unger and Sorel towards his exploration of the possibility of a 
‘radically transformed moral and social order’ (Honneth, 2009: 92) which promised an ‘exit 
out of historical experience’ (Ibid.). Honneth turns to biographical narrative to find cause 
for Benjamin’s political turn at this point – away from literary criticism and towards the 
political. He locates it squarely in Benjamin’s reading of Bloch’s ‘eschatological charging of 
the Marxist concept of revolution’ in The Spirit of Utopia.  It is worth returning to Honneth’s 
opening statement where he proposes that:
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Benjamin tries to accomplish nothing less than precisely reversing the 
polarity of these two concepts, so that violence appears as the source 
and fundament of politics and law, to the contrary, as its endpoint. 
The function of this proposed reinterpretation is to be able to interpret 
politics as an event that is in itself free of ends, detached from all 
human purposes, and to that extent is ‘religious.’ (Honneth, 2009:.94)
	 For	Honneth,	Benjamin’s	critique	attempts	to	identify	‘that	level	of	experience	that	
does	not	fit	into	the	classic	subject-object	schema	but,	rather,	explodes	its	instrumentalism	
in one or another direction’ (2009: 95). This must be a standpoint without the normal terms 
of	reference	of	ends	and	means	but	encompassing	both:	within	a	philosophical-historical	
view.	Honneth	regards	this	construct	as	only	making	sense	to	Benjamin	in	a	religio-divine	
narrative of the withdrawal and subsequent return of God to the world. A position weighted 
with	the	difficulty	of	trying	to	find	a	‘lookout’	from	which	to	judge	‘the	delusive	context	
of the present’ (2009: 98). According to Honneth this is set alongside a (revolutionary) 
violence	of	 the	future	-	 ‘pure’	divine	violence	–	 ‘free	from	goal	setting	and	instrumental	
considerations’ (2009: 99). While this is an understandable reading it makes Divine violence 
appear as merely another form of arbitrary ‘mythic’ violence, despite Benjamin’s distinction 
between the two (however problematic that distinction). 
	 While	Honneth	 cites	Bloch’s	 influence	he	does	not	 say	what	 shape	 this	 influence	
takes.  While the following, taken from the 1923 edition, does not appear in the 1918 edition 
it is a development of the trajectory of Bloch's thought in 1918. In his Chapter titled ‘The 
Shape	 of	 the	 Inconstruable	 Question’	 Bloch	 offers	 this:	 ‘girded	 with	 despair,	 with	 our	
defiant	presentiment,	with	the	enormous	power	of	our	human	voice,	we	may	also	designate	
God’ (Bloch, 2000,: 172).  This does not read as a passive humanity awaiting Salvation in 
the depths of its total moral collapse, although much of the text does have this feel: it also 
contains tropes of 'woman' and the female that certainly warrant further critique. Despite 
its poetic, ecstatic form, there is more than poetry in phrases such as: ‘Only this thinking 
wishful	dream	brings	about	something	real	[…]	–	waiting	for	the	word,	turned	towards	the	
enlightenment of great maturity. […] [E]verything that is has a utopian star in its blood, and 
philosophy would be nothing if it did not form the ideational solution for this crystalline 
heaven of renewed reality’ (2000: 171). The utopian star acts as a goad, the prompt, and its 
solution is not provided by faith, but through thought, ideation. A second Enlightenment, 
in	this	respect	would	resemble	the	first,	but	burdened	with	the	experience	and	knowledge	
of modernity, much harder to achieve. The position of the ‘incognito’ self did not trouble 
the	first	Enlightenment,	but	it	must	trouble	the	next	and	this	sets	up	the	downfall	of	subject-
object relations: ‘Who is nothing, however, will no longer encounter anything outside, 
either’ (2000: 173) and in any event as Bloch later observes when discussing Kant, ‘Platonic 
panlogism [is] impermissible in modernity’ (2000, p. 177). If Benjamin’s ‘God’ is the product 
of his reading of Bloch, it cannot be intended towards a mere ‘reinsertion’ of God into the 
human narrative. It is clear from both Benjamin and Bloch that ‘God’ cannot operate in the 
same way as in the past. The conditions for God’s ‘existence’ have changed irreversibly. 
	 Butler	offers	a	different	version	of	Benjamin’s	‘God’.	For	Butler	it	is	clear	that	Benjamin	
associates God (and the general strike) with action that is ‘destructive but nonviolent’  and 
this is problematic. The answer for Butler is to return to the idea of the commandment 
which ‘is not an instance of law giving’ but ‘leads to the destruction of law as coercively 
binding’		(Butler,	2006:	209).		While	it	is	an	extremely	attractive	idea	and	does	seem	to	sit	
well with Benjamin’s comment that Divine violence does not strike at the soul of the living, 
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this point is difficult to square with the Biblical example he gives of the destruction of the 
Korah and Butler notes that it begs the troubling question as to who constitutes ‘the living’ 
in this example (Butler, 2006: 210).
 For Benjamin divine violence has an educative capacity reflected in ‘present-day life’ 
(Benjamin, 1978/2007: 297). The bloodless expiation and the absence of all law-making in 
manifest divine violence has the power to do away with ‘goods, right, life, and suchlike, 
never absolutely, with regard to the soul of the living’ (Benjamin, 1978/2007: 297-8). The 
soul of the living hearkens back to that conscious ‘end-in-itself-ness’ that recognises in the 
death sentence its exceptionalism and perhaps in the absence of a law of divine violence 
the absence also of justice? It sanctions the ‘self’ sacrifice of the individual who strikes and 
suffers as a result – hunger and/or death, because the Divine cannot coerce or demand, 
but may inspire sacrifice. There is an undoubted opacity in Benjamin’s observations at this 
point. He suggests one conclusion to be drawn would be the permission this could suggest 
for humankind to hold ‘lethal power against one another’ (1978/2007: 298). Yet he pulls back 
from this because human beings are inhibited by the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ 
which stands against it. Benjamin then considers the function of the commandment. It is not 
for post facto judgment in his view, but for before the act reflection. It plays an interrogatory 
role that each individual must take in relation to his or her self. It does not provide the 
answer, it gives the challenge. It is not a rule, but a guideline and he cites the exception 
in Judaic law that allowed killing in self-defence, to show that in specific situations it will 
not apply. This agrees with Butler’s analysis.  She observes that the commandment, which 
may be refused, operates as a ‘condition for a theory of responsibility that has at its core an 
ongoing struggle with nonviolence’ (Butler, 2006: 205). 
 Benjamin then pointedly ridicules the equally misguided idea that killing is never 
permitted upon the basis of the sanctity of mere life. This position is equally unacceptable 
to Benjamin for ‘Man cannot, at any price, be said to coincide with the mere life in him, 
no more than with any other of his conditions and qualities, not even in the uniqueness 
of his bodily person’ (1978/2007: 299). Benjamin asserts that there is a ‘mighty truth’ in 
the thought that sacred life ‘means the irreducible, total condition that is “man”; if the 
proposition is intended to mean that the nonexistence of man is something more terrible 
than the (admittedly subordinate) not-yet-attained condition of the just man’ (Benjamin, 
1978/2007: 299). Butler recognises Benjamin’s interpretative approach to the commandment 
which in her terms is now a ‘form of ethical address’ ‘performative’ and ‘perlocutionary’ 
(Butler, 2006, p. 212). Nonetheless she suddenly hollows out its ethical content by returning 
it to an ‘anarchistic’ fold, ‘beyond or outside principle’ (Butler, 2006: 214).  
  If Benjamin’s view is taken seriously however and we allow it to converge with his 
wider political theology, and historico-philosophical views, then that ‘life’ (which we are 
enjoined not to take without great consideration and reflection), is much broader and greater 
than the mere condition of continuance: it means a revised commandment ‘Thou shalt not 
kill if in so doing you will kill…. history, freedom (the interrogatory self-reflective capacity), 
reason, argumentation or justice’. Only some such conclusion as this would justify the 
statement made in the conclusion of the essay: ‘Divine violence, which is the sign and seal 
but never the means of sacred execution, may be called sovereign violence’. The injunction 
against violence in the religious commandment, supplies in some sense that ‘external’ point 
of reference for behaviour not because it offers an a-historical ‘absolute’ position given 
or handed down as an inscription on a tablet, but because it has a history in the political 
life of human societies, from which it has a discernible meaning achieved through critical 
analysis, through its subjection to reason and its experience as a phenomenon or even a 
‘manifestation’. It cannot be the means of its own execution, because only the decision of 
Whittington, Walter Benjamin’s Zur Kritik der Gewalt
56
one human being, after reflection, to act upon another will provide the means.  In this way, 
the human subject of the death sentence might both rationally understand the justification 
for the sentence and intuitively sense its injustice, or alternatively the contemporary 
advocate of euthanasia might recognise a right to determine the end of mere life as rightly 
the choice of the rational individual.  This is violence at its most intersubjective – chosen - as 
an act done by individuals to other individuals. While Benjamin’s examination of violence 
revolves around law making, or state preserving violence, his analysis provides the tools to 
reduce it back to a ‘pure’ form – that which one person does to another. 
 Sometimes reason plays little or no part in violence and is simply a manifestation of 
rage unrelated to a preconceived end. In this form it is ‘not a means but a manifestation’ and 
its manifestation in this ‘archetypal’ form is the ‘mythical violence’ of the Gods. (Benjamin, 
1978/2007: 294). In the stories of Niobe and Prometheus who both suffered under the anger 
of the Gods Benjamin is exposing how ‘fate’ creates law in an arbitrary fashion. As Butler 
suggests, ‘Law is thus a specific consequence of an anger that responds to an injury, but 
neither that injury nor that anger are circumscribed in advance by law’ (Butler, 2006: 208). 
Butler observes the profound effect upon the recipient of mythic violence. Fate, which 
produces mythic violence, escapes the notice of the victim, who then wrongly accepts 
responsibility, exemplified by the suffering Niobe who weeps with remorse and internalised 
guilt.
 
To be a subject within these terms is to take responsibility for a 
violence that precedes the subject and whose operation is occluded 
by the subject who comes to derive the violence she suffers from her 
own acts. The formation of the subject who occludes the operation of 
violence by establishing herself as the sole cause of what she suffers is 
thus a further operation of that violence. (Butler, 2006: 208)
 This mythical violence persists in the modern law’s law-making capacity. Its 
connection with and descent from this mythical violence reveals that mythical violence is 
‘fundamentally identical with all legal violence, and turns suspicion concerning the latter 
into certainty of the perniciousness of its historical function, the destruction of which thus 
becomes obligatory’ (Benjamin, 1978/2007: 296-7). It is at this point that Benjamin turns 
to the idea of ‘God’ as standing against myth: ‘Just as in all spheres, God opposes myth, 
mythical violence is confronted by the divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in 
all respects’ (1987,2007:.297). Mythic is threatening, bloody and retributive, while Divine 
violence is immediate (without intermediary or forces other than those natural forces at 
God’s command to expedite it) lethal and expiatory. Benjamin contraposes the story of 
Niobe, with the Sovereign violence of God in the destruction of the Korah⁸ swallowed by 
the earth.  According to Benjamin: ‘Mythical violence is bloody power over mere life for 
its own sake, divine violence pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first 
demands sacrifice, the second accepts it”(198/2008: 297). In this sentence the key that will 
only appear later is the difference between ‘mere’ and ‘all’. It suggests that to the Gods of 
mythic violence (and by extension the law) human life is only ‘mere’ life, hollowed out 
from those aspects of personality that extend it beyond mere existence. However the Korah 
story is seriously problematic as an example of Divine violence. To suggest that in their 
case sacrifice was accepted, seems implausible unless God first opened the earth and then 
cordially invited the Korah to jump in, which according to the story is not the case. 
 Both Fate, and the Divine appear as originating first causes, suggesting that for 
human beings in the profane realm, all is already decided, whether ‘given’ or yet to come. 
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That human beings in the profane realm engage with the commandments they have 
unwittingly (without Reason) set up for themselves, paradoxically suggests an imagined 
realm of freedom, in which interrogation and critique could produce value, knowledge and 
freedom by way of a reflective engagement with the past and present course of events.  
For it is never reason that decides on the justification of means and 
justness of ends, but fate-imposed violence on the former and God on 
the latter. An⁹ insight that is uncommon only because of the stubborn 
prevailing habit of conceiving those just ends as ends of a possible 
law, that is, not only as generally valid (which follows analytically 
from the nature of justice), but also as capable of generalization, which 
as could be shown, contradicts the nature of justice. For ends that for 
one situation are just, universally acceptable, and valid are so for no 
other situation, no matter how similar it may be in other respects. 
(Benjamin, 1978/2007: 294)
In the profane ‘human’ realm our courses of action seem split impossibly between these two 
poles. It is through mankind’s relation to ‘commandment’ however that Benjamin offers, if 
not exactly ‘hope’ then something other than the pragmatic positivity of legality, and the 
transcendental justification of the Divine. The above passage suggests that all violence, in 
each historical instantiation might be subjected to a specific rather than a general critique 
and because the essential criteria of analysis required by that critique must include: 
a consideration of the social and historical moment in which violence is anticipated, an 
understanding of its character as myth or as divine and expiatory, an understanding 
of individual human subjects as instinctively self-conscious and as such irreducible to 
a function of mere life,  and an appreciation of the need for Reason to interrogate and 
challenge what is considered ‘natural’ or equally what is considered ordained.   Only from 
this standpoint can violence truly be contemplated - its utilisation as a means adopted or 
rejected; its value as an end constructed.  
Conclusion
In Zur Kritik Benjamin poses the question Schecter articulates in the following: ‘The point 
is that while the problems connected with the hermeneutic circle seem to be academic and 
philosophical, they actually touch upon an urgent issue of everyday life: how can justice 
be served without already knowing what justice is, bearing in mind that one will never 
know what justice is if one relies on ostensibly neutral means to arrive at something that 
is demonstrably not neutral, that is, justice?’ (Schecter, 2010: 61) For Schecter the forced 
reconciliation that produces the shadow of ‘justice’ produces violence ‘transfigured into 
rationalized legality and different forms of fetishism’ which Schecter sees played out 
in the State  torn  between apparent constitutional rationalism and dangerous anomic 
exceptionalism exposing the weakness and ‘blind spots’ of ‘liberal democratic Enlightenment’ 
(Schecter, 2010: 63). 
 How far Benjamin thought that ‘pure means’ would offer redemptive revelation 
to illumine the violent crack in the glass of liberal parliamentary democracy is not clear, 
what is possible is that he thought that the lived ‘heartfelt-ness’ (the subjective element) of 
interpersonal relations combined with the reason required for exegesis, while it need not 
guarantee a wholly nonviolent praxis, sets an extremely high bar for the use of violence 
in any given case. His lookout point is therefore not from the all-seeing, all knowing 
‘divine’ high point at the top of a lighthouse, nor even Honneth’s candidate - the position 
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of ‘manifest’ violence. It is rather the shifting lookout point from the small open boat, from 
which eternal vigilance is required to scan the horizon, and without which the chance of 
safe navigation is already given up as lost to arbitrary Fate, or Divine command, or some 
a-theist account of an all determining and unfree Nature. Benjamin’s essay suggests that the 
interrogatory approach is the only apparent way to navigate around the rocks of totalitarian 
response, nihilistic destructiveness, and fascistic anomie, by constant vigilance, (vigilantibus 
scriptum) informed not only by Reason, but by Herzenshöflichkeit, sensibility and dialogue 
in interpersonal relations together with the courage to engage in self-chosen self-sacrificial 
acts of non-violent overthrow. The metaphor of the boat and the danger of shipwreck were 
used by Benjamin as descriptors for his own critical position as Susanne Heil noted.10  
 Honneth sees a ‘discontinuity’ in Benjamin’s work in this early ‘political’ turn but 
fails to see in it also the inevitable continuity (with his work on language, literature, and 
imagination) and the importance of Benjamin’s use of the term ‘fate’ which permeates 
the text and which Benjamin chooses from his own critical lexicon as he understands it in 
relation to tragedy, fortune-telling, the semiotic and causation. His interest is repeatedly the 
manifestation of the real in the apparent and in the refusal of the forced coercion of reality 
under conceptual banners such as ends/means, creation/preservation, private/public. His 
process infused by metaphor and tropes of religious and mythical terms, explodes the idea 
of knowledge as limited only to a constant battle between the dark of mysticism and the light 
of Reason. Schecter recognises and draws out the importance of this aspect of Benjamin’s 
political writing –  its affinity with aesthetics. Too readily dismissed or disregarded merely 
‘for order in the name of order’, Benjamin can be ‘radical beyond all plausibility’ and is so 
precisely for how his method suggests a revolutionary epistemology that goes far beyond 
any straightforward critique of ‘pathological Reason’ that merely bounces back again to a 
retrograde theology. (Schecter, 2010: 70)
 In her concluding paragraphs Butler cautions that there are ‘many reasons to be 
suspicious’ of the theory Benjamin points towards in his essay; ‘Clearly he is not offering 
a plan for the future, but only another perspective on time. The essay ends on a note of 
destruction, but not transformation, and no future is elaborated’ (Butler, 2006: 218). Yet 
as suggested above there is an implied ethical framework for the political that, taking the 
commandment as a base, offers from the improbable ground of theological tropes a much 
less offensive image than that of the hunchback who controls the automaton. Instead, it 
becomes co-respondent in the historical interplay of fate and human action which demands 
of its human interlocutors, reflection, dialogue and critique – it cannot demand sacrifice, 
but it may invite it. Benjamin’s trope of the Divine offers the opportunity to engage 
reason and interpersonal kindness against an irrational fate, and a ‘soulless’ accusatory 
State which demands the sacrifice of lives for its sake and not theirs.  Benjamin holds off 
from making Fate the entire master of the universe, and in this sense he is not an a-theist 
obsessed with causality and he might still claim to recognise in some stories the hand of 
a transcendental Justice which is nowhere apparent in the everyday.  It does not suggest 
however that he could regard mere ‘faith’ in such an entity as sufficient for the ethical 
requirements of freedom to be met. Vigilance cannot be reliant upon commandment and 
doxa but must function with moral, intellectual and sensory data that are time and context 
bound. If Benjamin’s philosophico-historical approach is taken in these terms, then fear that 
his approach produces an inevitable slide towards (theocratic) fascism is dispelled.  In itself 
it may not be enough to prevent the storms of history driving the boat to the rocks, however 
it is unlikely to steer the boat towards them. 
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Endnotes
1  Unger, Politik und Metaphysik, Berlin, 1921, p.8 [ Benjamin’s footnote]
2 The influence of Schmitt on Benjamin has been explored in depth and debated by 
numerous critics in a series of papers and texts including the following: (Weber, 1992)  (Heil, 
1996) (Bredekamp, et al., 1999) (de Wilde, 2011) (Smith, 2012) (McNulty, 2007) (Pan, 2009) 
(Witte, 2011)
3 See Schmitt on ‘Liberalism versus Dictatorship’ in Political Theology (Schmitt & 
Schwab, 1985 (orig.1922,1934)) Pages 62-66. And The Concept of the Political  (Schmitt & 
Schwab, 1996,2007). For Schmitt, Liberalism is not synonymous with democracy - a position 
with which Marxists concur. 
4 This refers to the killing of three unarmed IRA suspects in Gibraltar in March 1988 
by the British SAS, famously reported in the This Week Thames television documentary 
‘Death on the Rock’ broadcast in April the same year which suggested a shoot to kill policy 
was in operation. 
5 The cases listed are cited on p.1 of the introduction to the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice, report Cm2263 1991-3 - the Runciman report. - The 1984 Act came about as 
a result of the Scarman Report into the Brixton riots of 1981. Scarman found significant and 
often justified distrust of the police, particularly among the black community of Brixton 
and Scarman’s report led not only to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, but also, 
ultimately, to the setting up of an independent police complaints commission. Concern 
regarding miscarriages of justice continued, particularly surrounding concerns over the 
conviction of alleged IRA terrorists and following a Royal Commission report Cm2263 
1991-3 (the Runciman report), the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) came into 
existence and began its work in 1997. 
6 Carl Schmitt, Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1988). [Honneth’s fn 38 p.115]
7 Ernst Bloch uses this phrase to imagine a ‘supramundane sphere’ – where, there 
being ‘absolutely no discrete sphere of validity’ and although fulfilment is not guaranteed, 
Kant’s postulates are actualised. (2000, pp. 173-179)
 8 Numbers, 16: 23 - 35
 9 ’And’ in the print copy (Benjamin, 1978/2007, p. 294), but clearly a misprint of ‘An’ 
[Eine in the original]
10 Heil illustrated Benjamin's metaphorical self identification with the Shipwrecked 
in this quotation from a letter from Benjamin to Gershom Scholem: >>Gut, ich erreiche 
ein Extrem. Ein Schiffbrüchiger, der auf dem Wrack treibt, in dem er auf die Spitze des 
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Mastbaums klettert, der schon zermürbt ist. Aber er hat die Chance, dort zu seiner Rettung 
ein Signal zu geben<<. [Good, I reach an extreme. A shipwrecked man afloat on the 
wreckage, who, already demoralised, clambers to the topmost point of the mast. But who 
has the chance from there to send a signal for his salvation. - Trans.VW] (Heil, 1996: 2)  
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